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On Guaspari’s problem about partially
conservative sentences
Taishi Kurahashi and Yuya Okawa
Abstract
We investigate sentences which are simultaneously partially conserva-
tive over several theories. We generalize Bennet’s results on this topic to
the case of more than two theories. Moreover, for any theories T and U ,
we give a new sufficient condition for the existence of Σn sentences which
are Πn-conservative over T but not provable in U .
1 Introduction
Let T be a recursively enumerable (r.e.) consistent extension of Peano Arith-
metic PA. Let Γ denote either Σn or Πn for some n ≥ 1. Also Th(T ) denotes
the set of all sentences provable in T and ThΓ(T ) denotes the set of all Γ sen-
tences provable in T . We say a sentence ϕ is Γ-conservative over T if for any
Γ sentence ψ, T ` ψ whenever T + ϕ ` ψ. Define Cons(Γ, T ) to be the set of
all Γd sentences which are Γ-conservative over T where Σdn = Πn and Π
d
n = Σn.
Guaspari [2] proved that Cons(Γ, T )\Th(T ) is non-empty, that is, there exist Γd
sentences which are Γ-conservative over T and unprovable in T . Also, Guaspari
asked the following question (in p. 62).
If {Ti}i∈ω is an r.e. sequence of r.e. theories, is there a Γ sentence
which is independent and Γd-conservative over each Ti? The question is
open even for sequence of length 2.
Guaspari actually proved that for any theory T , there are Γd sentences which
are T -unprovable and simultaneously Γ-conservative over all subtheories of T .
Thus for subtheories of T , Guaspari’s question has an affirmative answer.
On the other hand, Misercque [6] proved that Guaspari’s problem does not
hold in general. That is, Misercque found an infinite r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω of
theories such that there is no Γd sentence which is simultaneously unprovable
and Γ-conservative over Ti for all i ∈ ω. This is a counterexample of Guaspari’s
problem in the case of infinite r.e. sequences of theories.
Bennet [1] investigated Guaspari’s problem for two theories. Bennet firstly
proved that the statement “
⋂
i≤1
(
Cons(Γ, Ti) \Th(Ti)
) 6= ∅” saying that “there
exists a Γd sentence which is simultaneously unprovable and Γ-conservative over
T0 and T1” is equivalent to “Cons(Γ, T0)\Th(T1) 6= ∅ and Cons(Γ, T1)\Th(T0) 6=
1
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∅”. Thus the investigation of Guaspari’s problem for two theories is reduced to
that of the condition “Cons(Γ, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅”. Then, Bennet proved that
the condition “ThΓd(T ) * Th(U) or ThΓ(T ) + U is consistent” is sufficient for
Cons(Γ, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅. Furthermore, he proved that in the case of Γ = Σn,
“ThΠn(T ) * Th(U) or ThΣn(T ) + U is consistent” is actually equivalent to
Cons(Σn, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
We can easily find theories T0 and T1 not satisfying the condition “ThΠn(T0) *
Th(T1) or ThΣn(T0) + T1 is consistent”. Then we obtain
⋂
i≤1
(
Cons(Γ, Ti) \
Th(Ti)
) 6= ∅. This is a counterexample of Guaspari’s problem for two theories
in the case of Γ = Σn. Whereas, in the case of Γ = Πn, Bennet proved that
a similar equivalence as in the case of Γ = Σn does not hold. Also, Guaspari’s
problem for two theories in the case of Γ = Πn has not been settled yet.
In Section 2, we introduce some notation and facts. In Section 3, we survey
on already known results concerning Guaspari’s problem. In Section 4, we gen-
eralize Bennet’s results explained above to the case of theories more than two.
Among other things, we prove that for any r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories,
if there exists an r.e. set X of natural numbers such that
⋂
i/∈X ThΓd(Ti) *
Th(
⋃
i∈X ThΓn(Ti) +U), then
(⋂
i∈ω Cons(Γ, Ti)
) \Th(U) is non-empty. More-
over, we prove that the converse implication also holds for finite sequences of
theories in the case of Γ = Σn. We also give some counterexamples of several
implications. In Section 5, we investigate Σn sentences which are simultaneously
Πn-conservative over two theories. Then we give a new sufficient condition for
Cons(Πn, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
2 Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we consider only theories which are r.e. consistent ex-
tensions of Peano Arithmetic PA, hence we call such a theory simply a theory.
A sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories is r.e. if the set {〈i, ϕ〉 : ϕ ∈ Ti} is r.e. Let n
denote the numeral for a natural number n. We fix a natural Go¨del numbering,
and for any formula ϕ, let pϕq denote the numeral for the Go¨del number of ϕ.
The classes Σn and Πn of formulas are defined as usual. Throughout this paper,
Γ denotes either Σn or Πn for some n ≥ 1. Let Σdn = Πn and Πdn = Σn.
For each theory T , we can naturally construct a formula PrfT (x, y) whose
meaning is “y is the Go¨del number of a T -proof of a formula with the Go¨del
number x”. The Σ1 formula PrT (x) :≡ ∃yPrfT (x, y) is a standard provability
predicate of T .
Let Γ(x) be a ∆1 formula saying that “x is the Go¨del number of a Γ formula”
and let TrueΓ(x) be a Γ formula saying that “x is the Go¨del number of a true Γ
sentence” (see Ha´jek and Pudla´k [3]). Then define [Γ]T (x, y) to be the Γ formula
∀u ≤ y ∀v ≤ y(Γ(u) ∧ PrfT (x→˙u, v)→ TrueΓ(u)),
where x→˙y is a term such that for any formulas ϕ and ψ, PA ` pϕq→˙pψq =
pϕ→ ψq.
Then, the following fact holds.
2
Fact 2.1 (cf. Lindstro¨m [5]).
1. PA ` ∀x∀y∀z (([Γ]T (x, y) ∧ z ≤ y)→ [Γ]T (x, z)).
2. For all sentences ϕ and natural numbers m, T + ϕ ` [Γ]T (pϕq,m).
3. For all sentences ϕ and ψ, if ψ is Γ and T +ϕ ` ψ, then there is a natural
number q such that PA+ ¬ψ ` ¬[Γ]T (pϕq, q).
We use the following fact many times.
Fact 2.2 (cf. Lindstro¨m [5]). For any formulas α(x) and β(y), let σ :≡ ∃x(α(x)∧
∀y ≤ x¬β(y)) and σ∗ :≡ ∃y(β(y) ∧ ∀x < y¬α(x)). Then
1. PA ` ¬σ ∨ ¬σ∗.
2. PA ` (∃xα(x) ∨ ∃yβ(y))→ (σ ∨ σ∗).
At last, we define the following sets.
Definition 2.3. Let T be a theory and M be a model.
• ω is the set of all natural numbers.
• For any k ∈ ω, Ik := {0, . . . , k}.
• Th(T ) := {ϕ : T ` ϕ and ϕ is a sentence }.
• ThΓ(T ) := {ϕ ∈ Γ : T ` ϕ and ϕ is a sentence }.
• ThΓ(M) := {ϕ ∈ Γ : M |= ϕ and ϕ is a sentence }.
3 Background
The notion of partially conservative sentences has been appeared in the con-
text of the incompleteness theorems. For example, Kreisel [4] showed that the
negation of the consistency statement of T is Π1-conservative over T , that is,
for any Π1 sentence pi, T ` pi whenever T + ¬ConT ` pi. This is an extension
of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem. For another example, Smoryn´ski [9]
proved that T is Σ1-sound if and only if every T -undecidable Π1 sentence is
Σ1-conservative over T . Also, Smoryn´ski proved that T is Σ1-sound if and only
if ConT is Σ1-conservative over T .
Guaspari investigated the general concept of Γ-conservativity in [2].
Definition 3.1. Let T be any theory.
• A sentence ϕ is said to be Γ-conservative over T if for all Γ sentences ψ,
if T + ϕ ` ψ, then T ` ψ.
• Let Cons(Γ, T ) := {ϕ ∈ Γd : ϕ is Γ-conservative over T}.
3
Every T -provable Γd sentence ϕ is trivially contained in Cons(Γ, T ). Also,
Guaspari proved that every theory has non-trivially Γ-conservative Γd sentences,
that is,
Fact 3.2 (Guaspari [2]). For any theory T , Cons(Γ, T ) \ Th(T ) 6= ∅.
If T ` ¬ϕ, then T +ϕ is inconsistent, and hence ϕ is not Γ-conservative over
T because T is consistent. This shows that if ϕ ∈ Cons(Γ, T ) \Th(T ), then ϕ is
undecidable in T . Therefore Fact 3.2 can be thought as an extension of Go¨del-
Rosser’s first incompleteness theorem. Moreover, the following strengthening of
Fact 3.2 is proved by Solovay.
Fact 3.3 (Solovay (cf. Guaspari [2])). Let T be any theory. There is a Γd
sentence ϕ such that ϕ ∈ Cons(Γ, T ) \ Th(T ) and ¬ϕ ∈ Cons(Γd, T ) \ Th(T ).
Mostowski proved the following generalization of Go¨del-Rosser’s first incom-
pleteness theorem.
Fact 3.4 (Mostowski [7]). Let {Ti}i∈ω be an r.e. sequence of theories. Then
there is a Π1 sentence ϕ such that ϕ, ¬ϕ /∈
⋃
i∈ω Th(Ti).
Then it is natural to expect the existence of a sentence which is simulta-
neously Γ-conservative over several theories. Actually, Guaspari proposed the
following problem.
Problem 3.5 (Guaspari [2]). For any r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories, does⋂
i∈ω(Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) 6= ∅ hold?
Also, Guaspari wrote that this problem is open even for sequences of length
two. In the remaining of this subsection, we survey on already known results
concerning Guaspari’s problem. Guaspari actually proved a stronger result than
Fact 3.2 that there exists a Γd sentence which is simultaneously Γ-conservative
over all subtheories of T . These sentences are called hereditarily Γ-conservative.
Definition 3.6. Let T be any theory.
• A sentence ϕ is said to be hereditarily Γ-conservative over T if for all
theories S such that T ` S ` PA, ϕ ∈ Cons(Γ, S).
• Let HCons(Γ, T ) := {ϕ ∈ Γd : ϕ is hereditarily Γ-conservative over T}.
Fact 3.7 (Guaspari [2]). For any theory T , HCons(Γ, T ) \ Th(T ) 6= ∅.
Following Guaspari’s study, Misercque and Bennet also investigated Guas-
pari’s Problem 3.5. Misercque proved that Guaspari’s problem does not gener-
ally hold.
Fact 3.8 (Misercque [6]). There is an r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories such
that for all Γ,
⋂
i∈ω(Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) = ∅.
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Since Misercque’s sequence of theories is not finite, it is not a counterexample
of Guaspari’s problem in the case of finite sequences of theories. Bennet analyzed
the existence of Γd sentences which are simultaneously Γ-conservative over two
theories. He showed that Guaspari’s problem for two theories can be reduced
to more easily studied problem.
Fact 3.9 (Bennet [1]). For any theories T0 and T1, the following are equivalent:
1.
⋂
i≤1(Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) 6= ∅.
2. Cons(Γ, T0) \ Th(T1) 6= ∅ and Cons(Γ, T1) \ Th(T0) 6= ∅.
Therefore, the investigation of Guaspari’s problem for two theories is equiv-
alent to that of the condition “Cons(Γ, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅”. For the condition
“Cons(Γ, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅”, Bennet gave the following sufficient condition con-
cerning theories T and U .
Fact 3.10 (Bennet [1]). Let T and U be any theories. Suppose either ThΓd(T ) 6⊆
Th(U) or ThΓ(T ) + U is consistent. Then Cons(Γ, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
In particular, in the case of Γ = Σn, this sufficient condition is also necessary
for Cons(Σn, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
Fact 3.11 (Bennet [1]). For any theories T and U , the following are equivalent:
1. Cons(Σn, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
2. ThΠn(T ) 6⊆ Th(U) or ThΣn(T ) + U is consistent.
Let ϕ be a sentence such that ϕ ∈ Cons(Πn,PA) \ Th(PA) (See Fact 3.2).
Let T0 := PA+ϕ and T1 := PA+¬ϕ. Then, it is easy to see ThΠn(T0) ⊆ Th(T1)
and ThΣn(T0) + T1 is inconsistent. Hence, Cons(Σn, T0) \ Th(T1) = ∅ by Fact
3.11. Therefore, by Fact 3.9,
⋂
i≤1(Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) = ∅. That is, this is
a counterexample of Guaspari’s problem for two theories in the case of Γ = Σn
(see also Lindstro¨m [5] Exersice 5.9.(a)).
For two theories, remaining Guaspari’s problem is the case of Γ = Πn and
this has not been settled yet. Thus Bennet proposed the following problem.
Problem 3.12 (Bennet [1]). Are there theories T and U such that Cons(Πn, T )\
Th(U) = ∅?
Bennet proved that the condition “Cons(Πn, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅” cannot be
characterized like Fact 3.11.
Fact 3.13 (Bennet [1]). There are T and U satisfying the following conditions:
1. Cons(Πn, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
2. ThΣn(T ) ⊆ Th(U).
3. ThΠn(T ) + U is inconsistent.
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Bennet also investigated Guaspari’s problem with respect to hereditarily
Γ-conservative sentences. He proved the following equivalence concerning the
statement
⋂
i≤1(HCons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) 6= ∅, which corresponds to Fact 3.9.
Fact 3.14 (Bennet [1]). For any theories T0 and T1, the following are equivalent:
1.
⋂
i≤1(HCons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) 6= ∅.
2. HCons(Γ, T0) \ Th(T1) 6= ∅ and HCons(Γ, T1) \ Th(T0) 6= ∅.
Bennet characterized the condition “HCons(Γ, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅” by using
Misercque’s method used in his proof of Fact 3.8.
Fact 3.15 (Bennet [1]). For any theories T and U , the following are equivalent:
1. HCons(Γ, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
2. ThΓ(T ) + U is consistent.
As a corollary to Facts 3.14 and 3.15, we have:
Corollary 3.16 (Bennet [1]). For any theories T0 and T1, the following are
equivalent:
1.
⋂
i≤1(HCons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) 6= ∅.
2. ThΓ(T0) + T1 and ThΓ(T1) + T0 are consistent.
4 Generalizations of Bennet’s results
In this section, we generalize Bennet’s results introduced in the last section.
This section consists of three subsections. In Subsection 4.1, we investigate
hereditarily Γ-conservative sentences. Then, we generalize Facts 3.14 and 3.15
to the case of theories more than two. In Subsection 4.2, we generalize Facts
3.9, 3.10 and 3.11. At last, in Subsection 4.3, we give some counterexamples of
several implications.
4.1 Hereditarily Γ-conservative sentences
In this subsection, we generalize Facts 3.14 and 3.15. First, we generalize Fact
3.14 to the case of finite sequences of theories.
Theorem 4.1. For any k ≥ 1 and theories T0, . . . , Tk, the following are equiv-
alent:
1.
⋂
i≤k
(
HCons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)
) 6= ∅.
2. For all i ≤ k,
(⋂
j 6=i
j≤k
HCons(Γ, Tj)
)
\ Th(Ti) 6= ∅.
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Proof. 1⇒ 2: This is trivial.
2⇒ 1: Suppose for all i ≤ k,
(⋂
j 6=i
j≤k
HCons(Γ, Tj)
)
\ Th(Ti) 6= ∅.
Case 1: Γ = Σn. For each i ≤ k, let ϕi ∈
(⋂
j 6=i
j≤k
HCons(Γ, Tj)
)
\ Th(Ti)
and let θi be a Πn sentence satisfying the following equivalence:
PA ` θi ↔
∧
j 6=i
j≤k
ϕj ∧ ∀y
[Σn]Ti(pθiq, y)→ ¬PrfTi(p∨
j≤k
θjq, y)
 .
We prove
∨
j≤k θj ∈
⋂
i≤k
(
HCons(Σn, Ti) \ Th(Ti)
)
.
First, we prove Ti 0
∨
j≤k θj for all i ≤ k. Assume there is an i ≤ k such that
Ti `
∨
j≤k θj , then there is a p ∈ ω such that PA ` PrfTi(p
∨
j≤k θjq, p). Also,
by Fact 2.1.(ii), Ti + θi ` [Σn]Ti(pθiq, p). Then, Ti + θi ` ∃y
(
[Σn]Ti(pθiq, y) ∧
PrfTi(p
∨
j≤k θjq, y)
)
. Hence, by the choice of θi, Ti+θi ` ¬θi. That is, Ti ` ¬θi.
By our assumption, Ti `
∨
j 6=i
j≤k
θj . For any j ≤ k with j 6= i, PA ` θj → ϕi by
the choice of θj . Therefore Ti `
∨
j 6=i
j≤k
θj → ϕi, and hence Ti ` ϕi. This is a
contradiction.
Next, we prove
∨
j≤k θj ∈ HCons(Σn, Ti) for all i ≤ k. Let S be a theory
and σ be a Σn sentence such that Ti ` S ` PA and S +
∨
j≤k θj ` σ. Then
S+θi ` σ. In particular, Ti+θi ` σ. Therefore, by Fact 2.1.(iii), there is a q ∈ ω
such that PA + ¬σ ` ¬[Σn]Ti(pθiq, q) and by Fact 2.1.(i), PA + ¬σ ` ∀y(q ≤
y → ¬[Σn]Ti(pθiq, y)). Since Ti 0
∨
j≤k θj , PA ` ∀y < q¬PrfTi(p
∨
j≤k θjq, y).
Hence PA+ ¬σ ` ∀y([Σn]Ti(pθiq, y)→ ¬PrfTi(p∨j≤k θjq, y)). Therefore, PA+
¬σ + ∧ i6=j
j≤k
ϕj ` θi by the choice of θi. Furthermore, S + ¬σ +
∧
j 6=i
j≤k
ϕj ` σ
because S + θi ` σ. Hence S +
∧
j 6=i
j≤k
ϕj ` σ. Let i0 ≤ k such that i0 6= i. Then,
S + ϕi0 ` ¬
∧
j 6=i0,i
j≤k
ϕj ∨ σ. Since ϕi0 ∈ HCons(Σn, Ti) and ¬
∧
j 6=i0,i
j≤k
ϕj ∨ σ is
a Σn sentence, S ` ¬
∧
j 6=i0,i
j≤k
ϕj ∨ σ. That is, S +
∧
j 6=i0,i
j≤k
ϕj ` σ. By repeating
this argument, we obtain S ` σ.
Case2: Γ = Πn. For each i ≤ k, let ϕi ∈
(⋂
j 6=i
j≤k
HCons(Πn, Tj)
)
\ Th(Ti)
and let θi be a Σn sentence satisfying the following equivalence:
PA ` θi ↔
∧
j 6=i
j≤k
ϕj ∧ ∃y
¬[Πn]Ti(pθiq, y) ∧ ∀z ≤ y¬PrfTi(p∨
j≤k
θjq, z)
 .
By the almost same argument as in Case 1, we conclude
∨
j≤k θj ∈
⋂
i≤k
(
HCons(Πn, Ti)\
Th(Ti)
)
.
Secondly, we generalize Fact 3.15 to the case of r.e. sequences of theories by
using Fact 3.15 itself.
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Theorem 4.2. For any r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories and for any theory U ,
the following are equivalent:
1.
(⋂
i∈ω HCons(Γ, Ti)
) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
2. For all k ∈ ω, (⋂i≤k HCons(Γ, Ti)) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
3.
⋃
i∈ω ThΓ(Ti) + U is consistent.
Proof. 1 ⇒ 2: This is trivial.
2⇒ 3: Suppose ⋃i∈ω ThΓ(Ti)+U is inconsistent. Then there is a k ∈ ω such
that
⋃
i≤k ThΓ(Ti) + U is inconsistent. Thus, there are Γ sentences ϕ0, . . . , ϕk
such that Ti ` ϕi for each i ≤ k and U `
∨
i≤k ¬ϕi. Let {ψj}j∈ω be an
enumeration of all Γd sentences and let T ji := PA+ϕi ∨¬ψj for each i ≤ k and
j ∈ ω. By the choice of ϕi, Ti ` T ji ` PA for each i ≤ k and j ∈ ω. We fix any
j ∈ ω. To prove either ψj /∈
⋂
i≤k HCons(Γ, Ti) or U ` ψj , we distinguish the
following two cases.
• Case1: There is an i ≤ k such that T ji 0 ϕi. Then ψj /∈ Cons(Γ, T ji )
because T ji + ψj ` ϕi. In particular, ψj /∈
⋂
i≤k HCons(Γ, Ti).
• Case2: For all i ≤ k, T ji ` ϕi. Then, for all i ≤ k, PA+ ¬ψj ` ϕi. Hence,
PA+ ¬ψj `
∧
i≤k ϕi. That is, PA `
∨
i≤k ¬ϕi → ψj . Since U `
∨
i≤k ¬ϕi,
U ` ψj .
Therefore, for any j ∈ ω, ψj /∈
⋂
i≤k HCons(Γ, Ti) or U ` ψj . That is,(⋂
i≤k HCons(Γ, Ti)
) \ Th(U) = ∅.
3⇒ 1: Suppose⋃i∈ω ThΓ(Ti)+U is consistent. Let T+ := PA+⋃i∈ω ThΓ(Ti).
Then T+ is a consistent r.e. extension of PA. Since T+ + U ` ThΓ(T+) + U ,
ThΓ(T
+)+U is also consistent. Therefore, there is a ψ ∈ HCons(Γ, T+)\Th(U)
by Fact 3.15. It suffices to show that ψ ∈ HCons(Γ, Ti) for any i ∈ ω. For each
i ∈ ω, let Si be a theory and ϕ be a Γ sentence such that Ti ` Si ` PA
and Si + ψ ` ϕ. Then ψ → ϕ is a Γ sentence provable in Si. Therefore,
PA + ThΓ(Si) + ψ ` ϕ. Since T+ ` PA + ThΓ(Ti) ` PA + ThΓ(Si) ` PA,
PA+ ThΓ(Si) ` ϕ by the hereditarily Γ-conservativity of ψ. That is Si ` ϕ.
Remark 4.3. Theorem 4.2 includes the case of finite sequences of theories. Let
T0, . . . , Tk and U be a finite sequence of theories. Let Ts := Tk for all s ≥ k+ 1.
Then {Ti}i∈ω is an r.e. sequence of theories and then the equivalence of the
following conditions 1 and 2 easily follows from Theorem 4.2.
1.
(⋂
i≤k HCons(Γ, Ti)
) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
2.
⋃
i≤k ThΓ(Ti) + U is consistent.
This remark can be applied to other results in our paper.
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Theorem 4.1 is about only finite sequences of theories. From Theorem 4.1,
the investigation of the condition “
⋂
i≤k+1
(
HCons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)
) 6= ∅” is re-
duced to that of the condition “
(⋂
i≤k HCons(Γ, Ti)
) \ Th(U) 6= ∅”. We do not
know whether this reduction can be applied to r.e. sequences of theories or not.
Hence, we propose the following problem.
Problem 4.4. For any r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories, are the following con-
ditions equivalent?
1.
⋂
i∈ω
(
HCons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)
) 6= ∅.
2. For all i ∈ ω,
(⋂
j 6=i
j∈ω
HCons(Γ, Tj)
)
\ Th(Ti) 6= ∅.
Of course, the implication 1 ⇒ 2 in this problem is obvious. The condition
2 in Problem 4.4 is characterized as follows.
Corollary 4.5. For any r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories, the following are
equivalent:
1. For all i ∈ ω,
(⋂
j 6=i
j∈ω
HCons(Γ, Tj)
)
\ Th(Ti) 6= ∅.
2. For all k ∈ ω, ⋂i≤k(HCons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) 6= ∅.
3. For all i ∈ ω, ⋃j 6=i
j∈ω
ThΓ(Tj) + Ti are consistent.
Proof. 1⇒ 2: Let k ∈ ω. Then for any i ≤ k,
(⋂
j 6=i
j≤k
HCons(Γ, Tj)
)
\Th(Ti) 6=
∅. Therefore, ⋂i≤k(HCons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) 6= ∅ by Theorem 4.1.
2 ⇒ 3: Let i ∈ ω and k ≥ i. Then
(⋂
j 6=i
j≤k
HCons(Γ, Tj)
)
\ Th(Ti) 6= ∅ by
Theorem 4.1. Hence,
⋃
j 6=i
j≤k
ThΓ(Tj) + Ti is consistent by Theorem 4.2. Since
k ≥ i is arbitrary, ⋃j 6=i
j∈ω
ThΓ(Tj) + Ti is consistent.
3 ⇒ 1: By Theorem 4.2.
4.2 Γ-conservative sentences
In this subsection, we generalize Facts 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11. First, we generalize
Fact 3.9. Since the proof is almost same as in our proof of Theorem 4.1, we
omit it.
Theorem 4.6. For any k ≥ 1, the following are equivalent:
1.
⋂
i≤k
(
Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)
) 6= ∅.
2. For all i ≤ k, (⋂j 6=i
j≤k
Cons(Γ, Tj)
) \ Th(Ti) 6= ∅.
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As in the case of hereditarily Γ-conservative sentences, we do not know
whether we can extend Theorem 4.6 to the case of infinite sequences of theories
or not. We consider the following three conditions:
(a)
⋂
i∈ω
(
Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)
) 6= ∅.
(b) For all i ∈ ω, (⋂j 6=i
j∈ω
Cons(Γ, Tj)
) \ Th(Ti) 6= ∅.
(c) For all k ∈ ω, ⋂i≤k(Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) 6= ∅.
Problem 4.7. Does the condition (b) imply the condition (a)?
As a corollary to Theorem 4.6, we obtain the following implications.
Corollary 4.8. For any r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories, (a) implies (b), and
(b) implies (c).
Proof. (a) ⇒ (b): This is trivial.
(b) ⇒ (c): Suppose for all i ∈ ω, (⋂j 6=i
j∈ω
Cons(Γ, Tj)
) \ Th(Ti) 6= ∅.
For k = 0.
⋂
i≤k
(
Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)
) 6= ∅ by Fact 3.2.
For k ≥ 1. (⋂j 6=i
j∈ω
Cons(Γ, Tj)
) \ Th(Ti) 6= ∅ for all i ≤ k. Therefore,⋂
i≤k
(
Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)
) 6= ∅ by Theorem 4.6.
In subsection 4.3, we will prove in Theorem 4.19 that the implication (c)
⇒ (b) does not hold in general. Remark that for hereditarily Γ-conservative
sentences, the corresponding implication of (c) ⇒ (b) was already proved in
Corollary 4.5.
Secondly, we generalize Fact 3.10. In the case of two theories, Fact 3.10 gives
two sufficient conditions “ThΓd(T ) * Th(U)” and “ThΓ(T ) + U is consistent”
for Cons(Γ, T ) \Th(U) 6= ∅. These two conditions are simply generalized to the
case of r.e. sequences of theories as the conditions “
⋂
i∈ω ThΓd(Ti) 6⊆ Th(U)”
and “
⋃
i∈ω ThΓ(Ti) + U is consistent”, respectively. Actually, we can show
that each of these generalized conditions implies
(⋂
i∈ω Cons(Γ, Ti)
) \Th(U) 6=
∅. Moreover, we found the following new condition which is also sufficient for(⋂
i∈ω Cons(Γ, Ti)
) \ Th(U) 6= ∅:
C1 : There is an r.e. set X ⊆ ω such that⋂
i∈ω\X
ThΓd(Ti) 6⊆ Th
(⋃
i∈X
ThΓ(Ti) + U
)
.
Here,
⋂
i∈∅ ThΓd(Ti) denotes the set of all sentences. Hence, the consistency
of
⋃
i∈ω ThΓ(Ti)+U implies C1 because ω is r.e. Also,
⋂
i∈ω ThΓd(Ti) 6⊆ Th(U)
implies C1 because ∅ is r.e. Therefore, the following theorem is indeed a gener-
alization of Fact 3.10.
Theorem 4.9. Let {Ti}i∈ω be any r.e. sequence of theories. If the condition
C1 holds for {Ti}i∈ω, then
(⋂
i∈ω Cons(Γ, Ti)
) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
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Proof. Let X ∈ ω be an r.e. set such that⋂
i∈ω\X
ThΓd(Ti) 6⊆ Th
(⋃
i∈X
ThΓ(Ti) + U
)
.
Then there is a Γd sentence ϕ satisfying the following two conditions:
1. ϕ ∈ ⋂i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti).
2.
⋃
i∈X ThΓ(Ti) + U + ¬ϕ is consistent.
Let T := PA +
⋃
i∈X ThΓ(Ti). Since X is an r.e. set, T is a consistent
r.e. extension of PA. Also, since
⋃
i∈X ThΓ(Ti) + U + ¬ϕ ` ThΓ(T ) + U + ¬ϕ,
ThΓ(T ) +U +¬ϕ is consistent. Therefore, there is a ψ ∈ HCons(Γ, T )\Th(U +
¬ϕ) by Fact 3.15.
We prove ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ (⋂i∈ω Cons(Γ, Ti)) \ Th(U).
Since U + ¬ϕ 0 ψ, we obviously obtain U 0 ϕ ∨ ψ. We prove ϕ ∨ ψ ∈
Cons(Γ, Ti) for any i ∈ ω. For i ∈ ω \X, trivially ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Cons(Γ, Ti) because
Ti ` ϕ. For i ∈ X, let γ be any Γ sentence such that Ti + ψ ` γ. Then
Ti ` ψ → γ. Since (ψ → γ) is a Γ sentence, PA + ThΓ(Ti) + ψ ` γ. Also,
since T ` PA + ThΓ(Ti) ` PA, we obtain PA + ThΓ(Ti) ` γ by the hereditarily
Γ-conservativity of ψ. Thus Ti ` γ. Hence, ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Cons(Γ, Ti). Therefore,
ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ ⋂i∈ω Cons(Γ, Ti).
Even if there is an X ⊆ ω such that ⋂i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) * Th(⋃i∈X ThΓ(Ti)+
U), the condition C1 does not always hold. This will be proved in Subsection
4.3 (Corollary 4.24). Thus we do not know whether the assumption ‘X is r.e.’
in the statement of Theorem 4.9 can be removed or not. Whereas, such a set
X can always be taken as a Π1 set.
Proposition 4.10. Let {Ti}i∈ω be an r.e. sequence of theories. If
⋂
i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) *
Th(
⋃
i∈X ThΓ(Ti)+U) for some X ⊆ ω, then
⋂
i∈ω\X′ ThΓd(Ti) * Th(
⋃
i∈X′ ThΓ(Ti)+
U) for some Π1 set X
′ ⊆ ω.
Proof. Suppose ϕ ∈ ⋂i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) and ⋃i∈X ThΓ(Ti) + U 0 ϕ. Let X ′ :=
{i ∈ ω : Ti 0 ϕ}. Then X ′ is a Π1 set because {Ti}i∈ω is an r.e. sequence.
Obviously ϕ ∈ ⋂i∈ω\X′ ThΓd(Ti). If i /∈ X, then Ti ` ϕ, and hence i /∈ X ′. This
means X ′ ⊆ X, and thus ⋃i∈X′ ThΓ(Ti) +U is a subtheory of ⋃i∈X ThΓ(Ti) +
U . Therefore
⋃
i∈X′ ThΓ(Ti) + U 0 ϕ. We conclude
⋂
i∈ω\X′ ThΓd(Ti) *
Th(
⋃
i∈X′ ThΓ(Ti) + U).
Related to this matter, we have the following corollary. Recall that for each
k ∈ ω, Ik = {0, . . . , k}.
Corollary 4.11. Let {Ti}i∈ω be an r.e. sequence of theories and U be a theory.
If there exists a set X ⊆ ω such that ⋂i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) * Th(⋃i∈X ThΓ(Ti)+U),
then for all k ∈ ω, (⋂i≤k Cons(Γ, Ti)) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
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Proof. Suppose that
⋂
i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) 6⊆ Th
(⋃
i∈X ThΓ(Ti) +U
)
for some X ⊆
ω. We fix a k ∈ ω and letX ′ := X∩Ik. Then
⋂
i∈Ik\X′ ThΓd(Ti) 6⊆ Th
(⋃
i∈X′ ThΓ(Ti)+
U
)
. Therefore,
(⋂
i≤k Cons(Γ, Ti)
) \ Th(U) 6= ∅ by Theorem 4.9.
At last, we generalize Fact 3.11 to the case of finite sequences of theories.
Theorem 4.12. Let k ∈ ω and let T0, . . . , Tk and U be theories. Then the
following are equivalent:
1.
(⋂
i≤k Cons(Σn, Ti)
) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
2. There is an X ⊆ Ik such that
⋂
i∈Ik\X ThΠn(Ti) 6⊆ Th
(⋃
i∈X ThΣn(Ti) +
U
)
.
Proof. 2 ⇒ 1: Since every finite set is r.e., this follows from Theorem 4.9.
1⇒ 2: Suppose⋂i∈Ik\X ThΠn(Ti) ⊆ Th(⋃i∈X ThΣn(Ti)+U) for allX ⊆ Ik.
Let ψ ∈ ⋂i≤k Cons(Σn, Ti) and let β(x) be a Πn−1 formula such that ¬ψ is
equivalent to ∃xβ(x). It is suffices to show U ` ψ. For this, we show the
following two claims.
Claim 1. Let m ≤ k. For all t ≤ m and all distinct natural numbers i0, . . . , it
in Ik, there exist Σn sentences ϕ〈i0,...,it〉 satisfying the following conditions:
(i) For any t ≤ m and any distinct natural numbers i0, . . . , it in Ik, Tit `
ϕ〈i0,...,it〉.
(ii) For any t ≤ m and any distinct natural numbers i0, . . . , it−1 in Ik, let
{j0, . . . , jk−t} := Ik \ {i0, . . . , it−1}. Then, U `
∧
s≤k−t ϕ〈i0,...,it−1,js〉 →∨
u<t ¬θ∗〈i0,...,iu〉.
Where, for each u ≤ m and distinct natural numbers i0, . . . , iu in Ik,
• α〈i0,...,iu〉(x) is a Πn−1 formula such that ϕ〈i0,...,iu〉 ≡ ∃xα〈i0,...,iu〉(x).
• θ〈i0,...,iu〉 :≡ ∃x(α〈i0,...,iu〉(x) ∧ ∀y ≤ x¬β(x)).
• θ∗〈i0,...,iu〉 :≡ ∃y(β(y) ∧ ∀x < y¬α〈i0,...,iu〉(x)).
Proof. By induction on m.
For m = 0. By our supposition with X = Ik, we obtain
⋂
i∈∅ ThΠn(Ti) ⊆
Th
(⋃
i∈Ik ThΣn(Ti) + U
)
. That is,
⋃
i∈Ik ThΣn(Ti) + U is inconsistent. Hence,
there are Σn sentences ϕ〈0〉, . . . , ϕ〈k〉 such that Tj ` ϕ〈j〉 for any j ∈ Ik =
{j0, . . . , jk} and U ` ¬
∧
s<k ϕjs . Then (i) holds. Since U `
∧
s<k ϕjs → ⊥, (ii)
also holds.
Assume that the claim holds for m. For any t ≤ m and any distinct natural
numbers i0, . . . , it in Ik, we take Σn sentences ϕ〈i0,...,it〉 satisfying two conditions
stated in the claim for m. Let i0, . . . , im be any distinct natural numbers in Ik.
For any t ≤ m, we show that Tit ` ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉 whenever Tit ` ϕ〈i0,...,it〉. Assume
Tit ` ϕ〈i0,...,it〉. Then Tit+ψ ` θ〈i0,...,it〉 by the choice of θ〈i0,...,it〉. Since θ〈i0,...,it〉
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is a Σn sentence and ψ ∈ Cons(Σn, Tit), we obtain Tit ` θ〈i0,...,it〉. Therefore,
by Fact 2.2 (i), Tit ` ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉. Thus, Tit ` ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉 for any t ≤ m by
induction hypothesis with (i). Thus Tis `
∨
t≤m ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉 for any s ≤ m.
Let {j0, . . . , jk−m−1} := Ik \ {i0, . . . , im}. Again by our supposition with X =
{j0, . . . , jk−m−1}, we obtain
⋂
s≤m ThΠn(Tis) ⊆ Th
(⋃
s≤k−m−1 ThΣn(Tjs)+U
)
.
Hence,
⋃
s≤k−m−1 ThΣn(Tjs) + U `
∨
t≤m ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉. That is, for each s ≤
k −m− 1, there is a Σn sentence ϕ〈i0,...,im,js〉 such that Tjs ` ϕ〈i0,...,im,js〉 and
U ` ∧s≤k−m ϕ〈i0,...,im,js〉 → ∨t≤m ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉. This shows (i) and (ii) for m+ 1.
Next, we prove the following claim.
Claim 2. Let m ≤ k and i0, . . . , ik−m be any distinct natural numbers in Ik.
Then,
U + ¬ψ `
∨
t≤k−m
¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on m.
Assume m = 0. For any t ≤ k, Tit ` ϕ∗〈i0,...,it〉 by Claim 1.(i). Therefore, by
the same argument as in proof of Claim 1, we obtain Tit ` ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉. Then,
Ti `
∨
t≤k ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉 for any i ∈ Ik. By our supposition with X = ∅, we
obtain
⋂
i∈Ik ThΠn(Ti) ⊆ Th
(
U
)
. Then, U ` ∨t≤k ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉. In particular,
U + ¬ψ ` ∨t≤k ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉.
Assume the claim holds for m. Let {j0, . . . , jm} = Ik \ {i0, . . . , ik−m−1}.
By induction hypothesis, for each s ≤ m, U + ¬ψ ` ∨t≤k−m−1 ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉 ∨¬θ∗〈i0,...,ik−m−1,js〉. Since PA+¬ψ ` θ〈i0,...,ik−m−1,js〉 ∨ θ∗〈i0,...,ik−m−1,js〉 and PA `
θ〈i0,...,ik−m−1,js〉 → ϕ〈i0,...,ik−m−1,js〉 for each s ≤ m, U+¬ψ `
∨
t≤k−m−1 ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉∨
ϕ〈i0,...,ik−m−1,js〉. Hence, U+¬ψ `
∨
t≤k−m−1 ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉∨
∧
s≤m ϕ〈i0,...,ik−m−1,js〉.
Also, U ` ∧s≤m ϕ〈i0,...,ik−m−1,js〉 → ∨t≤k−m−1 ¬θ∗〈i0,...,it〉 by Claim 1.(ii). There-
fore, U + ¬ψ ` ∨t≤k−m−1 ¬θ〈i0,...,it〉.
For any i ≤ k, U + ¬ψ ` ¬θ∗〈i〉 by Claim 2 with m = k. Since PA + ¬ψ `
θ〈i〉 ∨ θ∗〈i〉 and PA ` θ〈i〉 → ϕ〈i〉, U + ¬ψ ` ϕ〈i〉. Hence, U + ¬ψ `
∧
i≤k ϕ〈i〉. By
Claim 1.(ii), U + ¬ψ ` ⊥. That is, U ` ψ.
We close this subsection with a open problem concerning implications be-
tween conditions concerning infinite r.e. sequences of theories. We have dealt
with the following four conditions:
(I) There exists an r.e. setX ⊆ ω such that⋂i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) * Th(⋃i∈X ThΓ(Ti)+
U).
(II) There exists a setX ⊆ ω such that⋂i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) * Th(⋃i∈X ThΓ(Ti)+
U).
(III)
(⋂
i∈ω Cons(Γ, Ti)
) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
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(IV) For all k ∈ ω, (⋂i≤k Cons(Γ, Ti)) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
Then, for any r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories, we have the following impli-
cations:
(I)
(II)
(III)
(IV)
(I) ⇒ (II), and (III) ⇒ (IV) are trivial. (I) ⇒ (III) is Theorem 4.9. (II) ⇒
(IV) is Corollary 4.11.
In Subsection 4.3, we will prove that both of the implications (II)⇒ (I), and
(IV)⇒ (III) do not hold (Corollaries 4.21 and 4.24). Remark that for hereditar-
ily Γ-conservative sentences, the corresponding implication of (IV) ⇒ (III) was
already proved in Theorem 4.2. For Γ = Πn, Fact 3.13 gives a counterexample
of the implication (III) ⇒ (II). Therefore, for Γ = Πn, both of the implications
(III) ⇒ (I), and (IV) ⇒ (II) also do not hold. We do not know whether the
other implications hold or not.
Problem 4.13. Does the implication (II) ⇒ (III) hold? Also, for Γ = Σn, does
each of the implications (III) ⇒ (I), (III) ⇒ (II) and (IV) ⇒ (II) hold?
Notice that the implication (II) ⇒ (III) is a strengthening of Theorem 4.9
and Corollary 4.11. For Γ = Σn, the implications (III)⇒ (I) and (III)⇒ (II) are
generalizations of Theorem 4.12 to the case of infinite r.e. sequences of theories.
4.3 Counterexamples
In this section, we give counterexamples of several implications.
As we have already mentioned, we proved in Theorem 4.1 that the investiga-
tion of the condition “
⋂
i≤k+1
(
HCons(Γ, Ti)\Th(Ti)
) 6= ∅” is reduced to that of
the condition “
(⋂
i≤k HCons(Γ, Ti)
) \Th(U) 6= ∅”. Then we may expect that it
can be reduced to that of some simple conditions such as “HCons(Γ, T )\Th(U)”.
However this is not the case.
Theorem 4.14. For any k ≥ 1, there are theories T0, . . . , Tk+1 satisfying the
following conditions:
1.
⋂
i≤k+1
(
HCons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)
)
= ∅.
2. For all distinct i0, i1 ≤ k + 1,
(⋂
j 6=i0,i1
j≤k+1
HCons(Γ, Tj)
)
\ Th(Ti1) 6= ∅.
Proof. It suffices to find theories T0, . . . , Tk+1 satisfying the following two con-
ditions:
(i)
⋃
i≤k ThΓ(Ti) + Tk+1 is inconsistent.
14
(ii) For any i ≤ k + 1, ⋃ j 6=i
j≤k+1
Tj is consistent.
This is because (i) implies that
(⋂
i≤k HCons(Γ, Ti)
)\Th(Tk+1) = ∅ by Theorem
4.2. Therefore,
⋂
i≤k+1
(
HCons(Γ, Ti) \Th(Ti)
)
= ∅ by Theorem 4.1. Moreover,
(ii) implies that for all distinct i0, i1 ≤ k+1,
⋃
j 6=i0,i1
j≤k+1
ThΓ(Tj)+Ti1 are consistent.
Therefore, for all distinct i0, i1 ≤ k + 1,
(⋂
j 6=i0,i1
j≤k+1
HCons(Γ, Tj)
)
\Th(Ti1) 6= ∅
by Theorem 4.2.
Let ξ(x) be a Γ formula such that for any infinite binary sequence {ij}j∈ω,
PA + {ξ(j)ij : j ∈ ω} is consistent where ξ(j)0 :≡ ξ(j) and ξ(j)1 :≡ ¬ξ(j)
(See Lindstro¨m [5]). Let Tk+1 := PA +
∨
i≤k ¬ξ(i) and for each i ≤ k, let
Ti := PA+ξ(i). Then
⋃
i≤k ThΓ(Ti)+Tk+1 is obviously inconsistent. Moreover,
for i ≤ k, ⋃ j 6=i
j≤k+1
Tj is deductively equivalent to PA+
∧
j 6=i
j≤k
ξ(j)+¬ξ(i). Hence,⋃
j 6=i
j≤k+1
Tj is consistent by the choice of ξ(x). For i = k + 1,
⋃
j 6=i
j≤k+1
Tj is
deductively equivalent to PA +
∧
j≤k ξ(j). Hence,
⋃
j 6=i
j≤k+1
Tj is also consistent
by the choice of ξ(x). Therefore, for any i ≤ k+ 1, ⋃ j 6=i
j≤k+1
Tj is consistent.
Moreover, from the proof of Theorem 4.14, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.15. For any k ≥ 1, there are theories T0, . . . , Tk and Tk+1 satis-
fying the following conditions:
1.
(⋂
i≤k HCons(Γ, Ti)
) \ Th(Tk+1) = ∅.
2. For all i ≤ k,
(⋂
j 6=i
j≤k
HCons(Γ, Tj)
)
\ Th(Tk+1) 6= ∅.
For Γ-conservative sentences, we can prove a similar result to Theorem 4.14
only for k = 1 and Γ = Σn.
Theorem 4.16. There are theories T0, T1 and T2 satisfying the following con-
ditions:
1.
⋂
i≤2
(
Cons(Σn, Ti) \ Th(Ti)
)
= ∅.
2. For any distinct i, j ≤ 2, Cons(Σn, Tj) \ Th(Ti) 6= ∅.
Proof. First we prove that it is sufficient to show that there are theories T0, T1
and T2 satisfying the following three conditions:
(i)
⋂
i≤1 ThΠn(Ti) ⊆ Th(T2).
(ii) For any i ≤ 1, ThΣn(Ti) + T2 is inconsistent.
(iii) For any distinct i, j ≤ 2, ThΠn(Ti) 6⊆ Th(Tj).
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The condition (i) implies that
⋂
i∈I1 ThΠn(Ti) ⊆ Th(T2). The condition (ii) im-
plies that for anyX ⊆ I1 withX 6= ∅,
⋂
i∈I1\X ThΠn(Ti) ⊆ Th
(⋃
i∈X ThΣn(Ti)+
T2
)
. By combining them, we obtain that for any X ⊆ I1,
⋂
i∈I1\X ThΠn(Ti) ⊆
Th
(⋃
i∈X ThΣn(Ti)+T2
)
. Thus,
(⋂
i≤1 Cons(Σn, Ti)
)\Th(T2) = ∅ by Theorem
4.12. Then,
⋂
i≤2
(
Cons(Σn, Ti) \ Th(Ti)
)
= ∅ by Theorem 4.6. This shows
Clause 1 in the statement of Theorem 4.16. Clause 2 follows from the condition
(iii) by Fact 3.11.
We prove the existence of such theories T0, T1 and T2. Let ψ be a Σn sentence
such that ψ ∈ Cons(Πn,PA) \ Th(PA). Let T2 :≡ PA + ¬ψ and S :≡ PA + ψ.
Then, T2 and S are consistent. Moreover, let θ and θ
∗ be Π1 sentences satisfying
the following equivalences:
• PA ` θ ↔ ∀x ((PrfT2(pθq, x) ∨ PrfS(pθq, x))→ ∃y ≤ x(PrfT2(pθ∗q, y) ∨ PrfS(pθ∗q, y))).
• PA ` θ∗ ↔ ∀y ((PrfT2(pθ∗q, y) ∨ PrfS(pθ∗q, y))→ ∃x < y(PrfT2(pθq, x) ∨ PrfS(pθq, x))).
First, we show that T2 0 θ and S 0 θ. Suppose T2 ` θ or S ` θ, then
there is a least p ∈ ω such that PA ` PrfT2(pθq, p) ∨ PrfS(pθq, p). Hence PA `
θ → ∃y ≤ p(PrfT2(pθ∗q, y) ∨ PrfS(pθ∗q, y)). If N |= ¬∃y ≤ p(PrfT2(pθ∗q, y) ∨
PrfS(pθ∗q, y)
)
, then PA ` ¬∃y ≤ p(PrfT2(pθ∗q, y)∨PrfS(pθ∗q, y)) because it is a
true Σ1 sentence. Thus, PA ` ¬θ. This contradicts the consistency of T2 and S.
Therefore, N |= ∃y ≤ p(PrfT2(pθ∗q, y)∨PrfS(pθ∗q, y)). That is, there is a q ≤ p
such that N |= PrfT2(pθ∗q, q)∨PrfS(pθ∗q, q). Hence, there is a U ∈ {T2, S} such
that U ` θ∗ ∧ (PrfT2(pθ∗q, q) ∨ PrfS(pθ∗q, q)). By the choice of θ∗, U ` ∃x <
q
(
PrfT2(pθq, x) ∨ PrfS(pθq, x)
)
and U ` ∃x < p(PrfT2(pθq, x) ∨ PrfS(pθq, x))
because q ≤ p. However, PA ` ∀x < p¬(PrfT2(pθq, x) ∨ PrfS(pθq, x)) by the
minimality of p. This is a contradiction. Therefore, we get T2 0 θ and S 0 θ.
In a similar argument, T2 0 θ∗ and S 0 θ∗. Also, since PA ` θ ∨ θ∗ by Fact 2.2
(i), S 0 ¬θ and S 0 ¬θ∗.
Let T0 :≡ S + θ, T1 :≡ S + θ∗. Then T0 and T1 are consistent. We prove
that T0, T1 and T2 satisfy (i), (ii) and (iii).
First, we prove (i). Let pi ∈ ⋂i≤1 ThΠn(Ti) and we show T2 ` pi. Since
T0 ` pi and T1 ` pi, we obtain S ` (θ ∨ θ∗) → pi. Also, PA ` θ ∨ θ∗ by Fact
2.2.(i). Then S ` pi. That is, PA + ψ ` pi. By the Πn-conservativity of ψ,
PA ` pi. In particular, T2 ` pi.
Since Ti ` ψ for i ≤ 1 and T2 ` ¬ψ, (ii) is trivial.
Finally, we prove (iii). For each i ≤ 1, Ti 0 ¬ψ because Ti is consistent. Since
T2 ` ¬ψ, we obtain ThΠn(T2) 6⊆ ThΠn(Ti). Furthermore, if T1 ` θ, then S ` θ
because T1 = S + θ
∗ and PA ` θ ∨ θ∗. This is a contradiction. Hence T1 0 θ.
Since T2 0 θ and T0 ` θ, we obtain ThΠn(T0) 6⊆ Th(Ti) for each i ∈ {1, 2}. We
also obtain ThΠn(T1) 6⊆ Th(Ti) for each i ∈ {0, 2} because T1 ` θ∗, T0 0 θ∗ and
T2 0 θ∗.
Also, by the proof of Theorem 4.16, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.17. There are theories T0, T1 and T2 satisfying the following con-
ditions:
16
1.
(⋂
i≤1 Cons(Σn, Ti)
) \ Th(T2) = ∅.
2. For all i ≤ 1, Cons(Σn, Tj) \ Th(T2) 6= ∅.
We reconsider the following conditions introduced in Subsection 4.2.
(a)
⋂
i∈ω
(
Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)
) 6= ∅.
(b) For all i ∈ ω, (⋂j 6=i
j∈ω
Cons(Γ, Tj)
) \ Th(Ti) 6= ∅.
(c) For all k ∈ ω, ⋂i≤k(Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) 6= ∅.
Here we prove that the implication (c) ⇒ (b) does not hold. To prove this,
we prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 4.18. Let T be any theory which is not Σ1-sound. Then there exists a
Γ sentence ψ satisfying the following conditions:
1. ψ is not provably equivalent to any Γd sentence in T .
2. ψ is not Γd-conservative over T .
Proof. Let θ be a Π1 Rosser sentence of T . Then T 0 θ and T 0 ¬θ.
For Γ = Σn, let ξ :≡ ¬θ. Then ξ is not Π1-conservative over T (See Lind-
stro¨m [5] Exercise 5.1).
For Γ = Πn, let ξ :≡ θ. Since T is not Σ1-sound, ξ is not Σ1-conservative
over T (See Lindstro¨m [5] Exercise 5.2.(b)).
Let γ be a Γ sentence which is not provably equivalent to any Γd sentence
in T + ξ (See Lindstro¨m [5] Corollary 2.6). Then ψ :≡ ξ ∧ γ is a Γ sentence
satisfying the required conditions.
Theorem 4.19. There exists an r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories satisfying the
following two conditions:
1. For all k ∈ ω, ⋂i≤k(Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) 6= ∅.
2.
(⋂
i 6=0
i∈ω
Cons(Γ, Ti)
)
\ Th(T0) = ∅.
Proof. Let T be a theory which is not Σ1-sound. Let {ϕi}i≥1 be any effective
sequence of all Γd sentences with T ` ϕ1. By Lemma 4.18, there exists a Γ
sentence ψ such that ψ is not T -provably equivalent to any Γd sentence and
ψ is not Γd-conservative over T . Then there exists a Γd sentence ξ such that
T + ψ ` ξ and T 0 ξ. Also T 0 ψ and T 0 ¬ψ because ψ is T -equivalent to
neither 0 = 0 nor 0 6= 0.
Let Dk := {1, 2, . . . , k}. First, we recursively define an increasing sequence
{Xk}k≥1 of finite sets of natural numbers satisfying the following three condi-
tions for any k ≥ 1:
1. Xk ⊆ Dk.
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2. T 0 ξ ∨∨j∈Xk ϕj .
3. T ` ∨j∈Dk\Xk ¬ϕj → ξ ∨∨j∈Xk ϕj .
For k = 1, let X1 = ∅. Then
∨
j∈X1 ϕj ≡ ⊥. Since T 0 ξ, we have
T 0 ξ∨∨j∈X1 ϕj . Since T ` ϕ1, we also have T ` ∨j∈D1\X1 ¬ϕj → ξ∨∨j∈X1 ϕj .
Suppose Xk is already defined. We distinguish the following two cases.
• Case 1: T ` ϕk+1 ∨ ξ ∨
∨
j∈Xk ϕj . In this case, let Xk+1 = Xk. Since
T 0 ξ ∨∨j∈Xk ϕj , we obtain T 0 ξ ∨∨j∈Xk+1 ϕj .
From Clause 3 for Xk, T `
∨
j∈Dk\Xk ¬ϕj → ξ ∨
∨
j∈Xk ϕj . In this case,
T ` ¬ϕk+1 → ξ ∨
∨
j∈Xk ϕj . Since j ∈ Dk+1 \ Xk+1 if and only if j ∈
Dk \Xk and j = k+ 1, we obtain T `
∨
j∈Dk+1\Xk+1 ¬ϕj → ξ∨
∨
j∈Xk ϕj .
Therefore, T ` ∨j∈Dk+1\Xk+1 ¬ϕj → ξ ∨∨j∈Xk+1 ϕj .
• Case 2: T 0 ϕk+1 ∨ ξ ∨
∨
j∈Xk ϕj . In this case, let Xk+1 = Xk ∪ {k + 1}.
Then T 0 ξ ∨∨j∈Xk+1 ϕj .
From Clause 3 for Xk, T `
∨
j∈Dk\Xk ¬ϕj → ξ ∨
∨
j∈Xk ϕj . Since Dk+1 \
Xk+1 = Dk \Xk, we obtain T `
∨
j∈Dk+1\Xk+1 ¬ϕj → ξ ∨
∨
j∈Xk+1 ϕj .
The definition is completed. Let T0 := T+¬ψ and for i ≥ 1, Ti := T+¬ϕi∨ψ.
Since T 0 ψ and T 0 ¬ψ, these theories are consistent.
We prove that the sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories satisfies two conditions stated
in the theorem.
1. Fix any k. We prove that for any i ≤ k,
(⋂
j 6=i
j≤k
Cons(Γ, Tj)
)
\Th(Ti) 6= ∅.
For i = 0, let θk be the Γ
d sentence ξ ∨ ∨j∈Xk ϕj . Then we have T `∨
j∈Dk\Xk ¬ϕj → θk. Since T +ψ ` ξ, we obtain T +ψ ` θk. Therefore Tj ` θk
for all j ∈ Dk \Xk. This means θk ∈
⋂
j∈Dk\Xk ThΓd(Tj).
Suppose
⋃
j∈Xk ThΓ(Tj) + T0 ` θk. That is,
T +
∧
j∈Xk
(¬ϕj ∨ ψ) + ¬ψ ` ξ ∨
∨
j∈Xk
ϕj .
Then
T +
∧
j∈Xk
¬ϕj + ¬ψ ` ξ ∨
∨
j∈Xk
ϕj .
Since T +¬∧j∈Xk ¬ϕj ` ∨j∈Xk ϕj and T +ψ ` ξ, we obtain T ` ξ∨∨j∈Xk ϕj .
This is a contradiction. Therefore θk /∈ Th(
⋃
j∈Xk ThΓ(Tj) + T0).
Thus θk witnesses the non-inclusion
⋂
j∈Dk\Xk ThΓd(Tj) * Th(
⋃
j∈Xk ThΓ(Tj)+
T0). By Theorem 4.9, we conclude⋂
j 6=0
j≤k
Cons(Γ, Tj)
 \ Th(T0) 6= ∅. (1)
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For i 6= 0, suppose that the theory ⋃j 6=i
j≤k
ThΓ(Tj) + Ti is inconsistent. Then
ThΓ(T0) +
⋃
j 6=0
j≤k
Tj is inconsistent. Notice that for each j ≥ 1, the theory
Tj = T + ¬ϕj ∨ ψ is a subtheory of T + ψ. Hence T + ThΓ(T + ¬ψ) + ψ
is inconsistent. Then there exists a Γ sentence γ such that T + ¬ψ ` γ and
T + γ +ψ is inconsistent. Then we obtain T ` ψ ↔ ¬γ. This is a contradiction
because ¬γ is a Γd sentence. Therefore ⋃j 6=i
j≤k
ThΓ(Tj) + Ti is consistent. We
obtain
(⋂
j 6=i
j≤k
Cons(Γ, Tj)
)
\ Th(Ti) 6= ∅ by Theorem 4.9. By combining this
with (1), we conclude
for any i ≤ k,
⋂
j 6=i
j≤k
Cons(Γ, Tj)
 \ Th(Ti) 6= ∅.
By Theorem 4.6, this is equivalent to
⋂
i≤k(Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) 6= ∅.
2. It suffices to prove that for any i ≥ 1, either ϕi /∈ Cons(Γ, Ti) or T0 ` ϕi.
It is easy to show Ti + ϕi ` ψ. If Ti 0 ψ, then ϕi /∈ Cons(Γ, Ti) because ψ is
a Γ sentence. If Ti ` ψ, then T + ¬ϕi ∨ ψ ` ψ. Thus T ` ¬ϕi → ψ. Hence
T0 ` ϕi.
Since
⋂
i∈ω (Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) 6= ∅ obviously implies
(⋂
i6=0
i∈ω
Cons(Γ, Ti)
)
\
Th(T0) 6= ∅, we obtain the following corollary by Theorem 4.19. This is a coun-
terexample of the implication (c) ⇒ (a).
Corollary 4.20. There exists an r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories satisfying
the following two conditions:
1. For all k ∈ ω, ⋂i≤k(Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) 6= ∅.
2.
⋂
i∈ω (Cons(Γ, Ti) \ Th(Ti)) = ∅.
We also reconsider the following conditions introduced in Subsection 4.2.
(I) There exists an r.e. setX ⊆ ω such that⋂i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) * Th(⋃i∈X ThΓ(Ti)+
U).
(II) There exists a setX ⊆ ω such that⋂i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) * Th(⋃i∈X ThΓ(Ti)+
U).
(III)
(⋂
i∈ω Cons(Γ, Ti)
) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
(IV) For all k ∈ ω, (⋂i≤k Cons(Γ, Ti)) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
We obtain a counterexample of the implication (IV) ⇒ (III) from the proof of
Theorem 4.19.
19
Corollary 4.21. There exist an r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories and a theory
U satisfying the following two conditions:
1. For all k ∈ ω,
(⋂
i6=0
i≤k
Cons(Γ, Ti)
)
\ Th(T0) 6= ∅.
2.
(⋂
i 6=0
i∈ω
Cons(Γ, Ti)
)
\ Th(T0) = ∅.
For our construction of a counterexample of the implication (II) ⇒ (I), we
use the following fact.
Fact 4.22 (Guaspari [2]). For any r.e. set X ⊆ ω, there exists a Γ formula
δ(x) satisfying the following conditions for any i ∈ ω:
1. If i ∈ X, then T ` δ(i).
2. If i /∈ X, then ¬δ(i) is Γ-conservative over T .
Theorem 4.23. For any Π1 set X ⊆ ω, there exist an r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω
of theories and a theory U such that for any Y ⊆ ω, ⋂i∈ω\Y ThΓd(Ti) *
Th(
⋃
i∈Y ThΓ(Ti) + U) if and only if Y = X.
Proof. Let X be any Π1 set. Let T be some theory which is not Σ1-sound. By
Lemma 4.18, there exist a Γ sentence ψ and a Γd sentence ξ such that T 0 ψ,
T 0 ¬ψ, T + ψ ` ξ and T 0 ξ. Since ω \ X is an r.e. set, by Fact 4.22, there
exists a Γd formula δ(x) satisfying the following conditions for any i ∈ ω:
1. If i /∈ X, then T + ¬ψ ` δ(i).
2. If i ∈ X, then ¬δ(i) is Γd-conservative over T + ¬ψ.
Let Ti := T + ¬δ(i) ∨ ψ for i ∈ ω and U := T + ¬ψ.
Claim 1. The sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories satisfies the following conditions
for any i ∈ ω:
(i) If i /∈ X, then Ti is deductively equivalent to T + ψ.
(ii) If i ∈ X, then ThΓd(Ti) ⊆ Th(T ).
Proof. (i). Suppose i /∈ X. Then T + ¬ψ ` δ(i). Thus T ` (¬δ(i) ∨ ψ) ↔ ψ.
This means Ti = T + ¬δ(i) ∨ ψ is deductively equivalent to T + ψ.
(ii). Suppose i ∈ X. Then ¬δ(i) is Γd-conservative over T +¬ψ. For any Γd
sentence ϕ, suppose Ti ` ϕ. Then T + ¬δ(i) ∨ ψ ` ϕ, and hence T + ¬δ(i) ` ϕ
and T + ψ ` ϕ. We have T + ¬ψ + ¬δ(i) ` ϕ. By the Γd-conservativity of
¬δ(piq), T + ¬ψ ` ϕ. Hence T ` ϕ.
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First, we prove
⋂
i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) * Th(
⋃
i∈X ThΓ(Ti) + U).
By Claim 1.(i), for any i /∈ X, Ti ` ξ because T + ψ ` ξ. Then ξ ∈⋂
i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti).
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that the theory
⋃
i∈X ThΓ(Ti) +U proves
ξ. Then there are i0, . . . , ik−1 ∈ X such that T+
∧
l<k(¬δ(il)∨ψ)+¬ψ ` ξ. Thus
T+
∧
l<k ¬δ(il)+¬ψ ` ξ. This is equivalent to T+¬ψ+¬δ(i0) `
∨
0<l<k δ(il)∨ξ.
Since ¬δ(i0) is Γd-conservative over T+¬ψ and
∨
0<l<k δ(il)∨ξ is a Γd sentence,
T +
∧
0<l<k ¬δ(il)+¬ψ ` ξ. By repeating this argument, we obtain T +¬ψ ` ξ.
Since T+ψ ` ξ, T ` ξ. This is a contradiction. Therefore⋃i∈X ThΓ(Ti)+U 0 ξ.
We conclude
⋂
i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) * Th(
⋃
i∈X ThΓ(Ti) + U).
Next, we prove that if Y 6= X, then ⋂i∈ω\Y ThΓd(Ti) ⊆ Th(⋃i∈Y ThΓ(Ti) +
U). Let Y ⊆ ω such that Y 6= X. We distinguish the following two cases.
• Case 1: Y * X. Let j ∈ Y and j /∈ X. Then by Claim 1.(i), Tj is
deductively equivalent to T + ψ. Thus ψ ∈ ThΓ(Tj). Since U = T + ¬ψ,⋃
i∈Y ThΓ(Ti)+U is inconsistent. Therefore the inclusion
⋂
i∈ω\Y ThΓd(Ti) ⊆
Th(
⋃
i∈Y ThΓ(Ti) + U) trivially holds.
• Case 2: X * Y . Let j ∈ X and j /∈ Y . Let ϕ be any Γd sentence with
ϕ ∈ ⋂i∈ω\Y ThΓd(Ti). Then Tj ` ϕ. By Claim 1.(ii), ThΓd(Tj) ⊆ Th(T ).
Thus T ` ϕ. Since U is an extension of T , U also proves ϕ. This shows⋂
i∈ω\Y ThΓd(Ti) ⊆ Th(
⋃
i∈Y ThΓ(Ti) + U).
Therefore, {Ti}i∈ω and U satisfy the required conditions.
By Theorem 4.23, we obtain a counterexample of the implication (II)⇒ (I).
Corollary 4.24. There exist an r.e. sequence {Ti}i∈ω of theories and a theory
U satisfying the following two conditions:
1. There exists a set X ⊆ ω such that ⋂i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) * Th(⋃i∈X ThΓ(Ti)+
U).
2. There is no r.e. set X ⊆ ω such that ⋂i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) * Th(⋃i∈X ThΓ(Ti)+
U).
Proof. Let X ⊆ ω be a Π1 set which is not r.e. Let {Ti}i∈ω be an r.e. se-
quence of theories as in Theorem 4.23 for this X. Then,
⋂
i∈ω\X ThΓd(Ti) *
Th(
⋃
i∈X ThΓ(Ti) + U). Furthermore, for any r.e. set Y ,
⋂
i∈ω\Y ThΓd(Ti) ⊆
Th(
⋃
i∈Y ThΓ(Ti) + U) because Y 6= X.
5 Πn-conservative sentences for two theories
Let T0 := PA+ConPA and T1 := PA+¬ConPA, where ConPA :≡ ¬PrPA(p0 = 1q)
is the consistency statement of PA. Then it is easy to see that ThΣ1(T0) ⊆
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Th(T1) and ThΠ1(T0) +T1 is inconsistent. Thus Bennet’s Theorem 3.10 cannot
determine whether Cons(Π1, T0) \Th(T1) 6= ∅ or not. In this section, we give a
new condition which is sufficient to show Cons(Πn, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅. Then as a
corollary to our result, we obtain Cons(Π1, T0) \ Th(T1) 6= ∅.
We prepare some definitions.
Definition 5.1. Let T and U be any theories. A formula P (x) is said to be a Γ
semi-provability predicate of U in T if P (x) is a Γ formula and for any sentence
ϕ, if U ` ϕ, then T ` P (pϕq).
Definition 5.2. For any theory T and any formula P (x), let RfnP (Γ) :=
{P (pϕq) → ϕ : ϕ is a Γ sentence}. This set is called the Γ reflection prin-
ciple of P .
We found the following new condition which is sufficient for Cons(Πn, T ) \
Th(U) 6= ∅:
C2 : There is a Σn semi-provability predicate P (x) of U in T such that T `
RfnP (Πn).
First, we prove that the condition C2 is actually sufficient for Cons(Πn, T )\
Th(U) 6= ∅.
Theorem 5.3. If theories T and U satisfy the condition C2, then Cons(Πn, T )\
Th(U) 6= ∅.
Proof. Let P (x) be a Σn semi-provability predicate of U in T such that T `
RfnP (Πn). Let σ ∈ Cons(Πn, T ) \ Th(T ). Since T 0 σ, there is a model M
of T such that M 6|= σ. Also let U+ := U + ThΣn(M). We show U+ is
consistent. Suppose U+ is inconsistent. Then, there is a Σn sentence ψ such
that U ` ¬ψ and M |= ψ. Then T ` P (p¬ψq). Since ¬ψ is a Πn sentence,
T ` P (p¬ψq)→ ¬ψ by T ` RfnP (Πn). Therefore T ` ¬ψ. Since M is a model
of T , ¬ψ is true in M , a contradiction.
We may assume that σ ≡ ∃xδ(x) and P (x) ≡ ∃yPrf(x, y) for some Πn−1
formulas δ(x) and Prf(x, y). Let ϕ be a Σn sentence satisfying
PA ` ϕ↔ ∃x(δ(x) ∧ ∀y ≤ x¬Prf(p¬ϕ∗q, y)),
where ϕ∗ ≡ ∃y(Prf(p¬ϕ∗q, y)∧∀x < y¬δ(x)). We prove that ϕ ∈ Cons(Πn, T )\
Th(U).
First, we prove U 0 ϕ. If U ` ϕ, then U ` ¬ϕ∗ by Fact 2.2(i). Therefore
T ` P (p¬ϕ∗q) and M |= P (p¬ϕ∗q). In particular, there is a p ∈ M such that
M |= Prf(p¬ϕ∗q, p). Furthermore, since M |= ∀x¬δ(x), M |= ∀x < p¬δ(x).
Hence ϕ∗ is in ThΣn(M). Therefore U
+ ` ϕ∗, this contradicts the consistency
of U+.
Next, we prove ϕ ∈ Cons(Πn, T ). By the choice of ϕ, PA ` σ∧¬P (p¬ϕ∗q)→
ϕ. Since ¬ϕ∗ is a Πn sentence, T ` P (p¬ϕ∗q)→ ¬ϕ∗. Therefore T ` σ ∧ ϕ∗ →
ϕ ∧ ϕ∗, and by Fact 2.2(i), T ` σ ∧ ϕ∗ → ⊥. Then T ` σ → ¬ϕ∗. Also by Fact
2.2.(ii), T ` σ → (ϕ∨ϕ∗). Hence T ` σ → ϕ. Then, since σ ∈ Cons(Πn, T ), we
obtain ϕ ∈ Cons(Πn, T ).
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Notice that our Σ1 provability predicate PrU (x) of U is also a Σ1 semi-
provability predicate of U in T . Since the consistency statement ConU of U is
equivalent to RfnPrU (Π1) (cf. Smoryn´ski [8]), we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4. Let T and U be any theory. If T ` ConU , then Cons(Π1, T ) \
Th(U) 6= ∅.
For example, since PA + ConPA ` ConPA+¬ConPA , we obtain Cons(Π1,PA +
ConPA) \ Th(PA+ ¬ConPA) 6= ∅ from this corollary.
Next, we prove that the condition C2 is actually a new sufficient condition
to show Cons(Πn, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅. That is, we prove that C2 does not imply
any of “ThΣn(T ) * Th(U)” or “ThΠn(T ) + U is consistent”. To prove this, we
prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5. For any theories T and U , there is a Σn semi-provability predicate
P (x) of U in T satisfying the following conditions:
1. For all sentences ϕ such that U 0 ϕ, ThΣn(T + ¬P (pϕq)) ⊆ Th(T ).
2. If ThΠn(U) ⊆ Th(T ), then ThΣn(T + RfnP (Πn)) ⊆ Th(T ).
Proof. Let P (x) be a Σn formula satisfying the following equivalence:
PA ` ∀x(P (x)↔ ∃y(PrfU (x, y) ∧ [Σn]T (p¬P (x˙)q, y))),
where p¬P (x˙)q is a term corresponding to a primitive recursive function calcu-
lating the Go¨del number of ¬P (m) from m ∈ ω.
First, we prove P (x) is a semi-provability predicate of U in T . Let ϕ be any
sentence with U ` ϕ. Then there is a p ∈ ω such that T ` PrfU (pϕq, p). Also,
T + ¬P (pϕq) ` [Σn]T (p¬P (pϕq)q, p¯) by Fact 2.1. Therefore, T + ¬P (pϕq) `
P (pϕq) by the above equivalence. We conclude T ` P (pϕq).
We prove that P (x) satisfies two conditions stated in the lemma.
1. Let ϕ be any sentence such that U 0 ϕ and let σ be any Σn sentence
satisfying T + ¬P (pϕq) ` σ. Since σ is a Σn sentence, there is a q ∈ ω such
that T + ¬σ ` ∀y ≥ q¯¬[Σn]T (p¬P (pϕq)q, y) by Fact 2.1. Also, since U 0 ϕ,
T ` ∀y < q¯¬PrfU (pϕq, y). Hence, T + ¬σ ` ¬P (pϕq) by the choice of P (x).
That is, T + P (pϕq) ` σ. Therefore, T ` σ.
2. Assume ThΠn(U) ⊆ Th(T ). Let σ be a Σn sentence such that T +
RfnP (Πn) ` σ. Then there are Πn sentences pi0, . . . , pik−1 such that T `∧
i<k(P (ppiiq) → pii) → σ. If T ` pii, then T ` P (ppiiq) → pii. Hence, for
such pii, we can remove P (ppiiq) → pii from the conjunction. Therefore we
may assume that T 0 pii for all i < k. Then U 0 pii for all i < k because
ThΠn(U) ⊆ Th(T ). Also, since T ` ¬P (ppiiq) → (P (ppiiq) → pii), we ob-
tain T ` ∧i<k ¬P (ppiiq) → σ. Then, T + ¬P (ppi0q) ` ∧0<i<k ¬P (ppiiq) → σ.
Since
∧
0<i<k ¬P (ppiiq) → σ is a Σn sentence and U 0 pi0, we obtain T `∧
0<i<k ¬P (ppiiq) → σ by the first condition. By repeating this argument, we
conclude T ` σ.
Then, we prove that our sufficient condition C2 is actually a new one.
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Theorem 5.6. There are consistent theories T and U satisfying the following
conditions:
1. ThΣn(T ) ⊆ Th(U).
2. ThΠn(T ) + U is inconsistent.
3. There is a Σn semi-provability predicate P (x) of U in T such that T `
RfnP (Πn).
Proof. By Fact 3.3, there is a Σn sentence ϕ such that ϕ ∈ Cons(Πn,PA),
¬ϕ ∈ Cons(Σn,PA) and ϕ,¬ϕ /∈ Th(PA). Let T− := PA+¬ϕ and U := PA+ϕ.
Obviously, T− and U are consistent and ThΠn(U) ⊆ Th(PA) ⊆ Th(T−) by
the choice of ϕ. Also, there is a Σn semi-provability predicate P (x) of U in
T− satisfying two conditions of Lemma 5.5. Let T := T− + RfnP (Πn). If T
is inconsistent, then PA + RfnP (Πn) ` ϕ. In particular, T− + RfnP (Πn) ` ϕ.
Because ϕ is a Σn sentence and ThΠn(U) ⊆ Th(T−), T− ` ϕ by Lemma 5.5.2.
This contradicts the consistency of T−. Therefore, T is consistent.
We prove that T and U satisfy three conditions stated in the theorem.
The conditions 2 and 3 are immediate from the definitions of T and U .
We show 1. For any Σn sentences σ such that T ` σ, T− ` σ by Lemma
5.5.2. Since ¬ϕ ∈ Cons(Σn,PA), we obtain PA ` σ. Therefore U ` σ.
At last, we prove that our condition C2 together with Bennert’s condi-
tions “ThΣn(T ) * Th(U)” or “ThΠn(T ) + U is consistent” is not necessary for
Cons(Πn, T ) \ Th(T ) 6= ∅. This is a strengthenig of Fact 3.13.
Theorem 5.7. There are theories T and U satisfying the following conditions:
1. Cons(Πn, T ) \ Th(U) 6= ∅.
2. ThΣn(T ) ⊆ Th(U).
3. ThΠn(T ) + U is inconsistent.
4. T 0 RfnP (Πn) for all Σn semi-provability predicates P (x) of U in T .
Proof. By Theorems 5.3 and 5.6, there are theories T and U− satisfying 1, 2 and
3, but do not satisfy 4. Let U := U− + ¬ϕ where ϕ ∈ Cons(Πn, T ) \ Th(U−).
Since U− 0 ϕ, U is consistent. We prove that T and U satisfy four conditions
in the theorem.
The conditions 2 and 3 are immediate from the choice of T and the definition
of U . Since U is consistent, U 0 ϕ. Therefore, ϕ ∈ Cons(Πn, T ) \ Th(U). This
shows 1.
At last, we show 4. Suppose that there is a Σn semi-provability predicate
P of U in T such that T ` RfnP (Πn). Then T ` P (p¬ϕq) → ¬ϕ because ¬ϕ
is a Πn sentence. Since U ` ¬ϕ, T ` P (p¬ϕq). Hence T ` ¬ϕ. Then, T ` ⊥
because ϕ ∈ Cons(Πn, T ). This is a contradiction.
We close this paper with the following problem which is related to Bennet’s
Problem 3.12.
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Problem 5.8. Are there a natural number k ∈ ω and theories T0, . . . , Tk and
U such that
(⋂
i≤k Cons(Πn, Ti)
) \ Th(U) = ∅?
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